Qatar to hold first national election

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Powered by Guardian.co.ukThis article titled “Qatar to hold first national election” was written by Ian Black, Middle East editor, for The Guardian on Tuesday 1st November 2011 15.59 UTC

The Gulf state of Qatar is to hold its first national election for a royal advisory body – another sign that the upheavals of the Arab spring are prompting defensive reactions across the region.

The announcement, by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, signals an important, if largely symbolic, advance for a tiny country whose great wealth has allowed it to punch above its weight internationally, but without so far adopting the democratic standards it advocates for others.

Elections to the country’s Shura (consultative) council are to be held in the second half of 2013, though it is unclear whether it will be given legislative powers. Under Qatar’s 2003 constitution, 30 of the council’s 45 members will be elected and the remaining 15 appointed.

“We know that all these steps are necessary to build the modern state of Qatar and the Qatari citizen who is capable of dealing with the challenges of the time and building the country,” the emir told the council. “We are confident that you would be capable of shouldering the responsibility.”

Qatar has played a big role supporting the Arab uprisings of the last year, especially in Libya, where it was the first foreign government to recognise the Benghazi-based rebels and sent money, weapons and troops to help them.

Al-Jazeera, the Doha-based satellite TV channel that Qatar owns, has acted as a cheerleader for revolutions from Tunisia to Syria while the domestic politics of Qatar have remained more or less off-limits. Until now it has only held municipal elections.

But Qatar’s room for manoeuvre is also constrained by its powerful neighbour Saudi Arabia. Qatar took part in the Saudi-led intervention that crushed pro-democracy protests in Bahrain earlier this year. Bahrain and Kuwait both have relatively developed parliamentary systems.

“The Qataris are making concessions – either because they are genuinely nervous or because they feel they need to make a gesture,” said Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Gulf expert at the London School of Economics. “There is no pressure from Qatari citizens for a participatory opening. But the emir may feel he does not want to be outflanked by other Gulf countries and he thinks this a safe enough way to respond to the zeitgeist of the Arab spring.”

The official Qatar news agency quoted the emir as saying: “We must not only congratulate ourselves on our achievements, but we have to check whether our visions and aspirations are compatible with the expectations and hopes of our peoples.”

Qatar is attuned to its international image, especially after winning the bid to host the World Cup in 2022.

The country’s natural gas riches allow its population of just 350,000 nationals out of a resident population of 1.7 million to enjoy the world’s highest income per head, currently ,721 (£47,000) – and a comfortable cushion against unrest. Even so, in September, the government raised salaries, pensions and benefits for state and military employees by 60%, a move widely seen as an attempt to preserve stability.

Qatar’s responses mirror recent moves by other Arab monarchies to stave off popular unrest. The Saudis have invested billions of dollars in social welfare and job creation schemes while the king of Jordan has sacked two prime ministers and promised more reforms. Morocco is drawing up constitutional amendments to entrench democratic institutions and rights.

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Olympic Village snapped up by Qatari ruling family

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Powered by Guardian.co.ukThis article titled “Olympic Village snapped up by Qatari ruling family for £557m” was written by Julia Kollewe, for The Guardian on Friday 12th August 2011 20.32 UTC

London’s Olympic Village has been sold to the Qatari ruling family’s property company in a deal that leaves UK taxpayers £275m out of pocket.

Qatari Diar, the oil-rich state’s investment arm, and UK property developer Delancey Estates teamed up to buy the athletes’ village next to the Olympic Park in east London for £557m.

After the 2012 Olympic Games, the village will be converted into a neighbourhood with 2,818 homes, including 1,000 family homeswith three or four bedrooms. The rest of the properties range from studio flats to five-bedroom apartments. The area will also include a schoolwith 1,800 places for children aged three to 19, shops, bars, clinics and parks.

The Olympic Delivery Authority, which sold the site, had already sold 1,379 of the residences in the 11 blocks of the athletes’ village to Triathlon Homes for £268m in 2009. They will become affordable housing such as shared ownership or socially rented apartments.

Qatari Diar and Delancey plan to turn the bulk of their share of the residences – 1,439 properties – into private rental accommodation, rather than selling them. They say this will create the first UK private sector residential fund of more than 1,000 homes to be owned and directly managed as an investment.

At the moment, the apartments in the village do not have kitchens as athletes will eat at dining halls. They will be fitted out for long-term residential use after the games when kitchens will be added and new floors put in. The first tenants are due to move in in late 2013.

The joint venture also acquired six adjacent development plots with the potential for a further 2,000 new homes. The deal includes a profit-share that should provide income to the public sector in future.

Jeremy Hunt, the culture secretary, hailed the sale as a “fantastic deal that will give taxpayers a great return and shows how we are securing a legacy from London’s Games”. The village cost £1.1bn to build, but the ODA insisted it never expected to recoup building costs. “It was an entirely empty site, it didn’t have any infrastructure, roads or parks. There was always going to be a public sector contribution to help put those in,” said a spokesman.

He added: “We weren’t just looking for the highest bidder, but for the best owner with long-term commitment.” He said the ODA supported the property investors’ plans to turn most of the residences into rental accommodation.

Jamie Ritblat, chief executive of Delancey, said: “This acquisition reflects the first truly great residential investment opportunity in the UK; offering the chance to break the mould and create a sustainable leasing model to provide first class accommodation for those who see the chance to rent long-term, as the way forward.”

The ODA had to dip into the Olympic contingency fund and use £324m of public funds after a private developer, Lend Lease, failed to put forward a funding package in 2009 due to the financial crisis. That money will now be repaid to the Olympic budget out of the village sale proceeds – this has been uncertain during the economic downturn.

Qatari Diar already owns the Chelsea Barracks site, which it bought from the Ministry of Defence in 2007, and it will redevelop the US embassy in Grosvenor Square, London, as well as the Shell Centre on the South Bank.

The Qatari property developer has been embroiled in a high-profile row over the £3bn Chelsea Barracks scheme, which recently received the green light two years after Prince Charles intervened over plans for the 13-acre site. In June 2009, the developer withdrew its planning application after the Prince of Wales wrote to its chairman, the prime minister of Qatar, saying his “heart sank” when he saw the modernist design by Lord Rogers.

Qatari Diar’s then-partner, the CPC Group owned by the Monaco-based property developer Christian Candy, launched a high court action to claim £81m in compensation after the scheme’s collapse. The architects behind the revised plans are Dixon Jones, Squire and Partners and Kim Wilkie.

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God save the Arab kings?

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Powered by Guardian.co.ukThis article titled “God save the Arab kings?” was written by Brian Whitaker, for guardian.co.uk on Wednesday 27th April 2011 11.07 UTC

One of the less-discussed facts about the wave of uprisings in the Middle East is that the Arab monarchies are still relatively unscathed. The regimes most seriously challenged by popular protests – in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria – have all been republics. This may seem odd to Europeans whose revolutions over the centuries have been mainly about overthrowing kings.

To some extent, the apparent resilience of Arab monarchies may be a matter of luck. Most of them are in the Gulf and they have oil, which means they can (and do) use their money to buy off discontent. That does not apply to the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco, however, and oil wealth has not saved the Gaddafi regime from trouble in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Another possible explanation is that Arab monarchs, in the eyes of many of their citizens, have a stronger claim to legitimacy than republican leaders who came to power – or clung on to it – in dubious circumstances.

The monarchies base their legitimacy on religious or tribal roots. The rulers of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and the Emirates all came from old and prominent tribes and the “right” to rule was derived from their families’ status.

The Sabah family, for instance, was a clan of the Anizah tribe which migrated from Nejd – the central plateau of Saudi Arabia – to Kuwait in the 18th century and has ruled locally ever since. The Khalifa family was another clan from the same tribe that had arrived in Bahrain about the same time. The Thani family that rules Qatar is a branch of the Bani Tameem tribe and also arrived from Nejd in the 18th century.

The Saudi royal family has tribal roots too, though its main claim to legitimacy today is religious – so much so that the king’s religious title, Guardian of the Two Holy Shrines (Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in Islam) takes precedence over his royal title.

Similarly, the king of Jordan is official guardian of al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, regarded as Islam’s third holiest site. Jordan’s current monarch, Abdullah II, also boasts of being a “43rd generation direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad”. Meanwhile the king of Morocco embodies both “spiritual and temporal authority” and is known as Amir al-Mu’mineen – the prince (or commander) of the believers.

Although rule by birthright might seem an inherently objectionable form of government, the tribal and religious background makes it difficult to challenge in what are often highly traditional and patriarchal societies. In the monarchies where there have been significant protests, such as Morocco, Oman and Jordan, demonstrators have been demanding reform but without questioning the ruler’s right to govern – which is still very much a taboo. (Bahrain is a special case, where a Sunni Muslim minority rules over a Shia majority, making the legitimacy question much more obvious.)

While the legitimacy claims of Arab monarchs might not seem particularly convincing, especially to outsiders, those of the republics are even less so.

A number of revolutionary Arab regimes emerged in the 20th century whose credentials were based primarily on nationalism: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, the separate states of North and South Yemen – plus the Palestinian liberation movement, which fitted a similar mould.

Typically, these revolutionary regimes pursued populist or socialist strategies – nationalisation, land reform and so on – which held out the promise of a better future for the masses. At the same time, they presented themselves as defenders of the nation’s independence, resisting the corrupting, exploitative effects of western imperialism and in particular generating unfulfillable popular expectations regarding the conflict with Israel.

In the wake of successive defeats by Israel, and amid high unemployment, poverty and rampant corruption, it became all too obvious that they were failing to deliver.

Some of the republican regimes further undermined their credibility by starting to resemble monarchies. It began in 2000, when Bashar al-Assad inherited the Syrian presidency from his father. The dictators of Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia and Yemen also showed signs of intending to hand over power, eventually, to sons or other relatives.

Arabs mockingly combined the words for “republic” and “monarchy” to coin a new term for this type of state: jumlukiyya.

The republics – and especially the jumlukiyyas – thus found themselves scrabbling around for reasons to justify their existence. The problem was apparent even in 2004 when the UN’s Arab Human Development report spoke of a “crisis of legitimacy”:

“Most regimes, nowadays, bolster their legitimacy by adopting a simplified and efficient formula to justify their continuation in power. They style themselves as the lesser of two evils, or the last line of defence against fundamentalist tyranny or, even more dramatically, against chaos and the collapse of the state … “

“Sometimes,” the report said, “the mere preservation of the state entity in the face of external threats was considered an achievement sufficient to confer legitimacy.”

Strangely, it does not seem to have occurred to them that there was one way they might have re-established their legitimacy: by governing the country justly and well.

So it’s not very surprising that the regimes already toppled or currently under threat are republics of the family-run jumlukiyya variety. This does not mean the others are immune – and it’s worth recalling monarchs were overthrown in Egypt, Yemen and Libya during the 1950s and 1960s.

For now, though, the remaining monarchs are sitting on their thrones fairly comfortably. After a rocky moment, even the king of Bahrain seems to have won more time in power, thanks to support from the royals in neighbouring countries.

This gives them a breathing space in which to reform – if they choose to do so. Whether they will seize the opportunity is another matter. At present, Morocco and Kuwait are the only two that look as if they might, possibly, turn into constitutional monarchies with accountable government. But if they don’t change, their turn will surely come.

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Qatar’s decision is part of a high-stakes game

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Powered by Guardian.co.ukThis article titled “Qatar’s decision to send planes to Libya is part of a high-stakes game” was written by Jason Burke, for The Guardian on Thursday 24th March 2011 19.18 UTC

In an air-conditioned room down an alley in the old market of Qatar’s capital Doha, enthusiasts of “damah” gather most evenings. The ancient board game, rarely played in recent years, is now being revived by local enthusiasts. It is, afficionados say, a contest of strategy and finesse – and thus an apt metaphor for the high-stakes manoeuvring by the tiny Gulf state and its hereditary leader, 59-year-old Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, in recent weeks.

For a country the size of Belgium with a population of 1.7 million, Qatar has been playing an extraordinarily high-profile role. This weekend four Qatari fighter jets are set to join the allied forces already off the Libyan coastline. The combat deployment is the first by an Arab or Muslim-majority country and thus of critical diplomatic significance.

Then there is the key role played in the “Arab spring” by al-Jazeera, the satellite TV channel set up by the emir in 1996. Broadcasting from Doha, al-Jazeera is now the dominant Arabic-language news outlet in the region and increasingly recognised around the world. Al-Jazeera English is gaining fans.

“Al-Jazeera were the first on to the events in Tunisia. Its reports from there were watched by the Egyptians. Then its reports from Egypt were watched by everyone else. It has been a very important catalyst,” said Hugh Miles, author of Al-Jazeera: How Arab TV News Challenged the World. Others have gone further and described the successive uprisings as “fundamentally driven” by the TV channel.

Al-Jazeera’s role and Qatar’s decision to send planes are both rooted in Qatar’s size, its location on a spur of the Arabian peninsula and the emir’s efforts to ensure his country’s independence from much bigger neighbouring states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

As in a game of damah, the emir, who seized power from his father in 1995, has eschewed confrontation in favour of a more subtle strategy. “Any wise person would do the same”, said Faraj Almohammed, a 45-year-old economic advisor and keen damah player, in Doha’s old market last night. For despite wealth from its vast oil and gas reserves which means its inhabitants do not pay income tax or utilities bills and enjoy average incomes of £50,000, Qatar is vulnerable.

“The [Sandhurst-trained] emir is a military man and knows that Qatar is basically indefensible,” said Blake Hounshell, the Doha-based managing editor of Foreign Policy magazine. “He has thought laterally about ways of making Qatar more secure.” The emir’s main two strategic assets are al-Jazeera and diplomacy, said Mustafa Alani, analyst at the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai. “The aim is to give Qatar an importance out of proportion to its size. Al-Jazeera gives it a loud voice and the emir has made a huge effort to make Qatar the local mediator of choice too.”

Al-Jazeera broke with the stultifying broadcasting style of government-run channels in the region and rapidly became an integral part of the Arab world’s cultural landscape and immensely popular. “Al-Jazeera pitches itself at its viewership. It is Arab-owned, Arab-financed, based in an Arab city and … gives people what they want to hear in a language they understand,” said Miles, the author. For protesters across the region, the presence of al-Jazeera cameras means more than news. Exposure brings a measure of security. In Syria this week, demonstrators chanted: “We want al-Jazeera.” In Sana’a in Yemen, a handwritten sign read: “Al-Jazeera is part of our revolution.”

Such influence has inevitably caused problems for Qatar. Last year al-Jazeera, which means “the peninsula” in Arabic, was banned in Morocco, suspended in Bahrain and caused a diplomatic incident with Jordan. A camera crew was arrested by Nato-led troops in Afghanistan for “making propaganda”.

The channel has been restricted or targeted by almost every Arab state and many others, including the US. But it has also given the emir huge credibility and prestige among ordinary people.

Al Anstey, managing director of al-Jazeera’s English-language channel, said any challenge to governments was not deliberate but simply came from reporters covering “the facts on the ground”.

For analyst Alani, “like Qatar’s role as a mediator, al-Jazeera makes enemies but is a net gain in terms of influence.”

Qatari diplomacy is wide-ranging. Successfully bidding for the 2022 World Cup attracted global attention, as it was meant to. Qatar has good relations with the US, hosting its vast airbase at al-Udeid, and, relative to the rest of the region, with Israel too. It also maintains contacts with Hamas and Hezbollah, shares an oilfield with Iran and is careful to be friendly to Riyadh. Angering the latter is “not an option”, said one western diplomat based in the region, a factor in what some claim is al-Jazeera’s “systematic downplaying” of news of its neighbour. Anstey denied any bias. “We are financed by the state of Qatar but editorially entirely independent. We cover every story on its merits,” he said.

Qatar is seen as moderate, at least compared to its neighbours. Alcohol is not illegal, though it is an offence to drink or be drunk in public. Homosexuality is illegal, even if the laws are applied pragmatically. Political parties are banned and, according to Amnesty International, the founder of a human rights organisation was detained this month. To the surprise of some, al-Jazeera reported the arrest.

The effects of the channel on the region may be greater than the autocratic, if relatively moderate, emir of Qatar bargained for.

“Over the last decade, al-Jazeera has done more to educate Arabs about human rights, civil rights, democracy and the world than anyone else,” said Miles, the author. “Now anywhere in the Arab world you can have an informed discussion about what’s happening in the world … That is a huge change.”

The “Arab spring” appears likely to remain foreign news for al-Jazeera, however. “Qatar is unique in that there are really very few local tensions and no major threat to stability,” said Dr Jennifer Heeg, a Doha-based human rights specialist. “The biggest split is between locals and the migrant labourers. A day of rage was called recently and absolutely no one turned up.”

This means that, unlike other local rulers, the emir does not have to watch the sentiment of a restive “street”.

There is certainly little discontent among students in Education City, a vast complex of colleges set up by the emir on the outskirts of Doha. Students gathered for a snack after classes in the open-air cafeteria of the private Carnegie Mellon University said that, though relations between Qatar and Libya had been poor for a long time, it was the killing of an al-Jazeera cameraman near Benghazi two weeks ago, probably by Gaddafi’s henchmen, that justified Qatar’s military commitment to operation Odyssey Dawn. “I think [Qataris] … have the right to go and [avenge] their loss. I think all Arab countries should do the same. We are all Arab and we all should help each other,” said Muhammad Hadi, a 20-year-old business administration student. “I think Qatar wants to have more influence on the world [and] I am proud to live in this country.”

With additional reporting from Omar Chatriwalla and Shabina Khatri in Doha.

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Ice queens of the Arab world

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Powered by Guardian.co.ukThis article titled “Ice queens of the Arab world” was written by Nesrine Malik, for guardian.co.uk on Tuesday 15th February 2011 11.12 UTC

It started with Leila Trabelsi, the wife of President Ben Ali – the Arab world’s answer to Imelda Marcos, the Lady Macbeth of Tunisia, who allegedly made off with copious amounts of gold after the uprising that ousted her husband.

Attention then shifted to Suzanne Mubarak, Egypt’s ex-first lady, who shares her husband’s estimated bn fortune.

In the wake of King Abdullah’s dismissal of the government in Jordan this month, the latest Arab Wag in the spotlight is Queen Rania. Last week she was the subject of an unprecedented attack by a group of Jordanian tribal figures complaining about the ruling family and widespread corruption. According to the statement, the queen and “her sycophants and the power centres that surround her” are dividing Jordanians and “stealing from the country and the people”.

As the wave of dissent sweeping the region puts Arab presidents and monarchs under the spotlight, their wives are also being scrutinised for their lavish lifestyles and “interference” in politics.

Queen Rania in particular, a regular “frow” (front row) fixture at fashion shows in Paris and Milan and Giorgio Armani’s “muse” is well known for her fashion credentials and her Tatler-like lifestyle. Feted in the west, Rania is queen of one of the poorest countries in the region.

Most first ladies in the Arab countries are western educated (Suzanne Mubarak is half British) and thus are more comfortable in western circles of diplomacy and royalty. While they may be beautiful, articulate and impeccably styled ambassadors, on their home turf they often appear out of touch with the concerns of citizens.

In the oil-rich Gulf states, due to generally high living standards, the indulgences of first ladies (often more than one per monarch) do not particularly grate. In addition, the conservative monarchies of the Gulf are generally more low profile and it is inconceivable that any of the Saudi king’s wives would tweet a picture of herself watching football in Barcelona.

When Gulf Wags do make a rare outing, they are mostly noted for their style. Sheikha Moza of Qatar caused a frenzy last year with her icicle-heeled Chanel boots on a state visit to the UK.

The latest royal spouse to make an outing is Princess Amira, wife of the unconventional Saudi multi-billionaire, Prince Waleed bin Talal. Rarely seen in the obligatory Saudi abaya, she recently accompanied her husband to the opening of the refurbished Savoy Hotel in London. She has commented that she is “ready to drive” in Saudi Arabia and is often photographed meeting her husband’s charity causes in the kingdom in jeans and T-shirts.

While there is nothing uncommon about the wives of political leaders coming under scrutiny for their appearance (Michelle Obama’s choices of dress and designer are in the headlines almost as often as her husband’s policy making), Arab first ladies are even more celebrated in the west for their exotic take on western styles.

While it is understandable that Queen Rania’s international jetsetting, along with her large palace office and entourage, might be provocative to some Jordanians, the local criticisms of her are not devoid of prejudice. The queen is of Palestinian origin, part of a Palestinian emigre community in Jordan that has an often tense relationship with native Jordanians. Old-fashioned misogyny also creeps into the discourse: a youthful, tweeting, Armani-clad, charity-sponsoring queen does not go down well with the traditional tribal leaders who wield considerable power in the country.

Since public criticism of the king and the institution of monarchy is taboo in Jordan (and carries a penalty of three years’ imprisonment), the queen also provides a softer target. Those who criticised her last week were actually firing a warning salvo aimed at the king.

Queen Rania talks eloquently about change and women’s rights on Oprah, yet Jordan’s human rights record under the stewardship of her husband has been poor. Most tragically, Jordan still has the highest incidence of honour killings in the Arab world and, according to Amnesty International’s 2010 report on Jordan, “perpetrators of such killings continued to benefit from inappropriately lenient sentences”.

Irrespective of whether the attack on Queen Rania is fair, it is increasingly clear that the wives of kings and presidents across the Arab world are being seen and treated as an extension of the unaccountable regimes presided over by their husbands.

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